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HUDSON V MCMILLIAN: REJECTING THE
SERIOUS INJURY REQUIREMENT, BUT
EMBRACING THE MALICIOUS-AND-
SADISTIC STANDARD
Prisons, as institutions of punishment and reform,' were not a prominent
fixture in the American criminal justice system until the nineteenth century.2
With the inception of the prison system, prisoners encountered degrading
and inhumane treatment.3 State and federal courts, however, were often
reluctant to criticize and rectify such treatment of prisoners.4 Instead, the
courts adopted a hands-off policy toward prisoners' complaints of excessive
1. DAVID RUDOVSKY ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF PRISONERS: THE BASIC ACLU GUIDE
TO PRISONERS' RIGHTS xi-xii (1988) (stating that prisons were originally intended to be a more
humane alternative to corporal and capital punishment, but they quickly evolved into inhu-
mane institutions). "[P]risons were also built with the idea of reformation: the penitentiary
was intended to serve as a place for reflection in solitude leading to repentance and redemp-
tion." Id. at xii. "Imprisonment was thought to be a deterrent to criminal activity.., and was
considered more humane than corporal punishment[,] ... [b]ut these prisons served in reality
only to punish-physicaliy and mentally." Id. at xi-xii; see also Special Project, The Collateral
Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 949 (1970) (noting that the
penitentiary was considered a novel penal institution advocated by enlightened American pe-
nologists who sought to reform prisoners).
2. See RUDOVSKY, supra note I, at xii. Prior to the creation of a penal penitentiary
system, convicts faced, as retribution for their crimes, either corporal or capital punishment.
Prisons did not become commonplace until the mid-1800s. Id. at xi; see also Special Project,
supra note 1, at 949 (stating that America's English heritage caused the colonies to base their
punishments on retribution and deterrence). Prior to the institution of the prison system,
criminal punishments were severely cruel. Id.
3. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682 nn.4-5 (1978) (whipping prisoners with a
leather strap and using a "Tucker telephone" to administer electrical shocks to prisoners);
Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1538 (11th Cir.) (inflicting pain with a cattle prod), cert.
denied, 496 U.S. 928 (1990); Wisniewski v. Kennard, 901 F.2d 1276, 1277 (5th Cir.) (placing a
revolver in prisoner's mouth and threatening to blow his head off), cert. denied I11 S. Ct. 309
(1990). See generally RUDOVSKY, supra note 1; Special Project, supra note 1.
4. See, e.g., United States ex rel Knight v. Ragen, 337 F.2d 425, 426 (7th Cir. 1964)
("Except under exceptional circumstances, internal matters in state penitentiaries are the sole
concern of the states and federal courts will not inquire concerning them.") (footnote omitted),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 985 (1965); Kirby v. Thomas, 336 F.2d 462, 464 (6th Cir. 1964)
("[Flederal courts do not have the power to regulate ordinary internal management and disci-
pline of prisons operated by the states .. "); Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir.)
("[I]t is not the function of the courts to superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners
in penitentiaries, but only to deliver from imprisonment those who are illegally confined."),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 829 (1951); see also RUDOVSKY, supra note I, at xii (discussing judicial
reluctance to intervene).
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force and other grievances with prison life.5 One legacy of the hands-off
policy, which persists today, is the showing of extreme deference toward
prison officials and administrators.6
5. See RUDOVSKY, supra note 1, at xii-xiii (discussing the courts' use of the hands-off
doctrine toward prisoner complaints).
The courts concurred with the notion that incarceration in prison was for punish-
ment and adopted a "hands-off" policy which prevented prisoners from securing any
rights except those their jailers allowed. Few persons, including lawyers, attempted
to challenge this policy....
The practical effect of the "hands-off" policy was to place all decisions concerning
internal affairs of the prison within the discretion of the prison officials, no matter
how arbitrary and inhumane the results. The courts continually deferred to the so-
called expertise of the prison administration in refusing even to hear complaints by
prisoners concerning violations of their most fundamental rights.
Id. at xii-xiii; David J. Gottlieb, The Legacy of Wolfish and Chapman: Some Thoughts About
"Big Prison Case" Litigation in the 1980s, in 1 PRISONERS AND THE LAW 2-3, at 2-4 (Ira P.
Robbins ed., 1990) (stating that the hands-off doctrine endured because of the theory that
prisoners are slaves of the state, separation of powers, federalism, lack of judicial knowledge
and expertise in prison issues, fear of opening the doors to increased litigation, and concern for
state finances); Michael C. Friedman, Note, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the Provision of
Prison Medical Care: Challenging the Deliberate Indifference Standard, 45 VAND. L. REV.
921, 927 (1992) (noting that throughout the period during which the hands-off doctrine pre-
vailed, courts almost exclusively deferred to prison administrators and officials when deciding
cases dealing with abuse or deprivations of prisoners); see also The Supreme Court, 1990 Term:
Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REV. 177, 235-36 (1991) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (noting
that courts maintained their hands-off attitude toward prisoners' complaints about prison con-
ditions until the 1970s). "The 1970's saw a general shift in prisoners' rights jurisprudence
away from the traditional 'hands-off' doctrine mandating deference to prison officials toward
less acquiescent standards under which courts lent a more receptive ear to prisoners' constitu-
tional grievances." Id.. See generally Stuart B. Klein, Prisoners'Rights to Physical and Mental
Health Care: A Modern Expansion of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 7-12 (1978).
6. See, Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1986). The Court stated:
"[A] prison's internal security is peculiarly a matter normally left to the discretion of
prison administrators" ... .Prison administrators ... should be accorded wide-
ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their
judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain insti-
tutional security." That deference extends to a prison security measure taken in re-
sponse to an actual confrontation with riotous inmates, just as it does to prophylactic
or preventive measures intended to reduce the incidence of these or any other
breaches of prison discipline.
Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 n.14 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
547 (1979)); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 585 (1984) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 547);
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 351-52 (maintaining that the judiciary should be mindful of the expertise
of state legislatures and prison officials); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974)
(stating that "courts are ill-equipped to deal with the ... problems of prison administration
and reform"), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407-14
(1989); Kathryn R. Urbonya, Establishing a Deprivation of a Constitutional Right to Personal
Security Under Section 1983: The Use of Unjustified Force by State Officials in Violation of the
Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 51 ALB. L. REV. 173, 212-13 (1987) (noting the
broad deference shown by the Supreme Court toward prison officials in Whitley v. Albers);
Russell W. Gray, Note, Wilson v. Seiter: Defining the Components of and Proposing a Direction
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The Supreme Court did not apply the Eighth Amendment to the states
until 1962.' Consequently, federal courts did not begin to apply the Eighth
Amendment to the general treatment of prisoners in American prisons until
the late 1960s and early 1970s.8 In 1986, the Supreme Court first stated that
the use of excessive force in prisons falls under the Eighth Amendment's
ban against cruel and unusual punishments.9 Today, the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause ° protects prisoners in the United States from physi-
cal attacks by their guards."' The scope and effectiveness of this protection,
for Eighth Amendment Prison Condition Law, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1339, 1346 n.33 (1992)
(commenting that "[o]ne recurring theme in Supreme Court cases restricting constitutional
protection for the incarcerated is that courts should defer to the judgment of state legislators
and prison officials").
7. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962). The Court applied the Eighth
Amendment to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
The Court, in Robinson, held that imprisoning someone because of his status as a drug addict
violated the Constitution's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. Id. at 667.
The justices struck down a California law that sentenced anyone convicted of being addicted to
the use of narcotics to a 90-day jail term. Id. at 667-68. The Court reasoned that drug addic-
tion is an illness and imprisoning a drug addict because of his illness is a punishment dispro-
portionate to the offense. Id. at 667.
8. See Gray, supra note 6, at 1344; see also Leon Friedman, New Developments in Civil
Rights Litigation and Trends in Section 1983 Action, in 1 SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS LITI-
GATION AND ATrORNEYS' FEES 1992: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 325 (PLI Litig. & Admin.
Practice Course Handbook Series No. H-448, 1992) (stating that the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized five types of actionable wrongs committed by government officials against prisoners).
The use of excessive force, the denial of medical treatment, the creation of improper condi-
tions, the denial of claims of entitlement without due process, and the restriction of the right to
communicate and worship constitute the five areas of cases involving government officials in-
vading or denying the constitutional rights of prisoners. Id.
9. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327; see Friedman, supra note 5 (stating that before the 1960s, no
federal courts regulated the use of excessive force by prison guards); see, e.g., Johnson v. Glick,
481 F.2d 1028, 1030-31 (2d Cir.) (discussing whether or not "an unprovoked attack on a
prisoner by a state prison guard" is one of the rights protected by the Eighth Amendment),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664-71 (1977)
(holding that the Eighth Amendment only applies to claims of excessive force after the victim
has been convicted of a crime).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment provides "[e]xcessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id.
11. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327. The Court stated, "[w]e think the Eighth Amendment,
which is specifically concerned with the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in penal
institutions, serves as the primary source of substantive protection to convicted prisoners in
cases... where the deliberate use of force is challenged as excessive and unjustified." Id. The
Court further stated that the Eighth Amendment, rather than the Fourth Amendment, applies
to prison excessive force cases "[b]ecause [these] case[s] involve[ ] prison inmates rather than
pretrial detainees or persons enjoying unrestricted liberty .... [T]he Due Process Clause
affords respondent[s] no greater protection than does the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause." Id.; see Ira. P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L.
REV. 531, 717 n.858 (1989) (noting that "[t]he eighth amendment provides post-conviction
protection against excessive force"); see also Bradley M. Campbell, Comment, Excessive Force
Claims: Removing the Double Standard, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1369, 1370 (1986) (noting that
1993]
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however, is determined by judicial interpretations of the Eighth
Amendment. 12
In 1976, the Supreme Court established that prison officials violate the
Eighth Amendment if they show "deliberate indifference" toward a pris-
oner's physical needs. 13 The Supreme Court did not, however, adopt the
deliberate indifference standard in its first excessive force case, because in
that case the alleged excessive force occurred during a prison riot.14 The
Court determined that in dangerous conditions, such as those of a prison
riot, a guard's use of excessive force violates the Eighth Amendment only if
the guard acted "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm." 15 In 1991, the Court synthesized its prior Eighth Amendment
prison jurisprudence by requiring that plaintiffs prove an Eighth Amend-
ment violation by establishing that both the amendment's objective com-
ponent, whether the violation was sufficiently serious, and its subjective
component, whether the guard acted with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind, are met. 16 The Court determined that a showing that the prison offi-
cial acted with deliberate indifference satisfies the Eighth Amendment's sub-
jective component.17 Thus, while the Court seemed to hold that the
deliberate indifference standard is the applicable standard in all Eighth
Amendment cases concerning the conditions of prison life, the Court did not
announce what level of severity of injury, if any, was necessary to satisfy the
Eighth Amendment's objective component in an excessive force case. In
addition, the Court never determined if the malicious-and-sadistic standard
applied to prison excessive force cases absent precarious, riotous
circumstances.
To fill the vacuum left by the Supreme Court's lack of definitive guidance
on this issue, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit devel-
"[m]ost courts consider police use of excessive force in both arrest and detention as violative of
the guarantee of due process under the fourteenth amendment").
12. Compare Huguet v. Barnett 900 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that significant
injury is an element in prison excessive force cases) and Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530,
1533 (11 th Cir. 1990) (maintaining that "the prisoner must offer some evidence of injury be-
yond a minimal one"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1003 (1991) and Corselli v. Coughlin, 842 F.2d
23, 26 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that "the extent of the injury is but one of the factors to be
considered") with McHenry v. Chadwick, 896 F.2d 184, 187 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that "a
prisoner alleging an eighth amendment violation need not prove that he suffered a serious
physical injury") and Williams v. Boles, 841 F.2d 181, 182 (7th Cir. 1988) (requiring no "se-
vere injury").
13. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S 97, 104 (1976); see infra notes 71-79 and accompanying
text.
14. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986); see infra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
15. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (1973)).
16. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991); see infra notes 111-129 and accompa-
nying text.
17. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326.
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oped a significant injury requirement in Eighth Amendment excessive force
cases.18 This doctrine mandated that a prisoner prove that he suffered a
significant injury as a result of a guard's use of excessive force. 19 If the pris-
oner's injury was not considered "significant," courts denied his Eighth
Amendment claim against abusive guards.2" Subsequently, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hudson v. McMillian 2 to deter-
mine whether the significant injury requirement "accords with the Constitu-
tion's dictate that cruel and unusual punishment shall not be inflicted."22
In Hudson, two prison guards punched and kicked inmate Keith Hudson
while he was handcuffed and shackled.23 The supervisor on duty watched
the beating, telling the two guards "'not to have too much fun.' "24 Even
though Hudson suffered only minor injuries as a result of the attack,25 he
brought suit in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.26 In this civil
18. See infra notes 130-38 and accompanying text.
19. Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc); see infra notes 130-39
and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 283 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that a prisoner
who alleged that he suffered a blackout as a result of a guard's chokehold, did not meet the
serious injury requirement); see also Williams v. Luna, 909 F.2d 121, 124 (5th Cir. 1990)
(discussing the serious injury requirement).
21. 111 S. Ct. 1679 (1991).
22. Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 998 (1992).
23. Id. at 997. Keith Hudson was an inmate and Jack McMillian and Marvin Woods
were corrections security officers at the state penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana. Id. Following
a verbal argument between McMillian and Hudson, the two guards handcuffed and shackled
Hudson and led him toward administrative lockdown. While the prisoner was still handcuffed
and shackled, "McMillian punched Hudson in the mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach while
Woods held the inmate in place and kicked and punched him from behind." Id. For further
background on the circumstances surrounding the Hudson case, see David Margolick, At the
Bar: From a Lonely Prison Cell, an Inmate Wins an Important Victory for Civil Liberties, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 1992 at B8 (explaining that the guards were angered because Hudson was
washing his clothes in the toilet in his cell).
24. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 997.
25. Id. The guards' blows bruised Hudson's face, split his lip, cracked his teeth, and
loosened his dental plate. Id.; see also Hudson v. McMillian, 929 F.2d 1014, 1015 (5th Cir.
1990) (describing Hudson's minor injuries), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
26. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 997. Hudson sued both McMillian and Woods as well as Mezo
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Individual prisoners may sue abusive guards under § 1983 if the
guards' abuse violates federal laws or the Constitution. Id.; see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 195 (1961) (maintaining that § 1983 applies even if there is a remedy available under state
law and holding that state officials act under color of law even when they exceed their author-
ity); PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FED-
1993]
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rights action, Hudson alleged that the guards' use of excessive force violated
his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punish-
ment.27 A federal magistrate ruled that the guards used unnecessary physi-
cal force.28 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed the magistrate's decision and held that Hudson could not
prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim because he did not suffer a signifi-
cant injury.29
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision.30 The Court re-
jected the Fifth Circuit's requirement that a prisoner prove he suffered a
significant injury to successfully bring an excessive force claim against physi-
cally abusive guards. 31 At the same time, the Court held that guards are
liable for their acts of excessive force only if the guards act "maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm.",32 In sum, the Court adopted the state-of-mind
standard that it had previously reserved for allegations of excessive force
ERAL SYSTEM 1242-43 (3d ed. 1988) (chronicalling the increase of § 1983 litigation following
Monroe v. Pape); 1 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION:
THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 2.02 (3d ed. 1991) (noting that Monroe v. Pape led to an influx
of prisoner and non-prisoner civil rights suits in federal courts); Gray, supra note 6, at 1344
n.20 (noting that through Monroe v. Pape, "[p]risoners gained substantial access to the federal
courts"). Persons, not states, are liable under § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989) (holding that a state is not a "person" for purposes of § 1983 and
cannot be held liable as such). Municipalities and local governments, however, are considered
"persons" and may be held liable under § 1983 if the policy or custom complained of was
officially adopted. Monnell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). In
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1981), the Supreme Court held that "government
officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil dam-
ages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. Prison guards and administra-
tors, however, receive only a qualified immunity, as opposed to the absolute immunity granted
to legislators, judges, and prosecutors. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1978)
(explaining that the scope of the qualified immunity depends on the prison official's discretion
and responsibilities and the circumstances surrounding the contested action). In the end, the
parties in Hudson agreed to a disposition of the case by a federal magistrate who awarded
Hudson $800. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 997.
27. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 998.
28. Hudson, 929 F.2d at 1015. The magistrate determined that "'defendants Woods and
McMillian used force on the plaintiff when there was no need .... Id. (quoting the Federal
District Court Magistrate).
29. Id.
30. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 995. A majority of seven justices reversed the decision. Justices
Scalia and Thomas dissented. Id.
31. Id. at 997. Justice O'Connor noted that "[o]therwise, the Eighth Amendment would
permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some
arbitrary quantity of injury. Such a result would have been as unacceptable to the drafters of
the Eighth Amendment as it is today." Id. at 1000. Justice O'Connor's opinion was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices White, Kennedy, and Souter, and was joined in part by Jus-
tice Stevens. Id. at 997.
32. Id. at 999 (relying on Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986); Johnson v.
Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (1973)).
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occurring during a prison riot.3 3 The Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals' dismissal and rejected the lower court's adoption of the significant
injury requirement.3 4
Justices Stevens and Blackmun, concurring separately, 35 each agreed with
the majority's rejection of the significant injury requirement and concurred
in the majority's reversal of the court of appeals' decision.3 6 Justice Stevens
concurred, however, because he thought that the majority's application of
the malicious-and-sadistic standard to all Eighth Amendment excessive
force cases was harsh and inappropriate.37 Justice Stevens advocated apply-
ing the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain standard a.3  Justice Black-
mun also disagreed with the majority's use of the malicious-and-sadistic
standard.3 9 Justice Blackmun wrote separately to stress that courts should
not implement Eighth Amendment judicial doctrines, like the significant in-
jury requirement, as docket-management measures.' Justice Blackmun also
clarified that the Eighth Amendment protects against the infliction of psy-
chological as well as physical harm.41
Justice Thomas, in his dissent, agreed with the Fifth Circuit that Hudson's
case should be dismissed, and argued that there should be a serious injury
requirement in excessive force cases.42 Justice Thomas based his conclusions
on the Eighth Amendment's historical role as a protection against harsh
criminal sentences, not a protection against harsh treatment of prisoners.43
Consequently, Justice Thomas does not believe force that results in only mi-
33. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320 (adopting the malicious-and-sadistic standard for cases of
excessive force during a prison riot); supra notes 96-107 and accompanying text. The Hudson
majority held that applying Whitley's adoption of the malicious-and-sadistic standard to all
claims of prison excessive force "works no innovation." Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 999.
34. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 997.
35. Id. at 1002.
36. Id.
37. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
38. Id. Justice Stevens remarked that the standard he advocated was "less demanding"
than the malicious-and-sadistic standard advocated by the majority. Id.
39. Id. at 1003 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun wrote, "[b]ecause I was in
the dissent in Whitley . . . I do not join the Court's extension of Whitley's malicious-and-
sadistic standard to all allegations of excessive force, even outside the context of a prison riot."
Id.
40. Id. at 1003.
41. Id. at 1004. Justice Blackmun commented, "I do not read anything in the Court's
opinion to limit injury cognizable under the Eighth Amendment to physical injury. It is not
hard to imagine inflictions of psychological harm... that might prove to be cruel and unusual
punishment." Id.
42. Id. at 1004-05 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas' dissent was joined by Justice
Scalia. Id
43. Id. at 1005. "For generations, judges and commentators regarded the Eighth Amend-
ment as applying only to torturous punishments meted out by statutes or sentencing judges,
and not generally to any hardship that might befall a prisoner during incarceration." Id.
1993]
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nor injuries to the prisoner violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause. '  Justice Thomas also reasoned that the Eighth Amendment con-
tains inherent objective and subjective components.45 According to Justice
Thomas, the Eighth Amendment's objective component is measured by the
severity of the harm alleged.46 In the context of excessive force cases, the
dissent concluded that the Eighth Amendment's objective component is sat-
isfied only by a serious injury.4 7
This Note first examines Eighth Amendment jurisprudence prior to Hud-
son v. McMillian by tracing the historical development of the scope and sub-
stance of the ban against cruel and unusual punishments. This Note then
analyzes the legal standards which were available to the Court in prison
excessive force cases. Next, this Note discusses the reasoning behind the
Justices' disagreement over the necessity of a significant injury requirement
and the applicability of the malicious-and-sadistic standard. This Note con-
cludes that the Court was correct in rejecting the significant injury require-
ment, but that the proper state of mind standard in prison excessive force
cases is "deliberate indifference" to a prisoner's bodily security, rather than
the majority's malicious-and-sadistic standard.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF EIGHTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ments was not an original idea of the framers of the Constitution." The
prohibition originated in the English Bill of Rights of 1689.49 Early Ameri-
can judicial interpretations of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
44. Id. "[A] use of force that causes only insignificant harm to a prisoner may be im-
moral, it may be tortious, it may be criminal, and it may even be remediable under other
provisions of the Federal Constitution, but it is not 'cruel and unusual punishment.' " Id.
45. Id. at 1006. "These subjective and objective components.., are implicit in the tradi-
tional Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, which focuses on penalties meted out by statutes or
sentencing judges." Id.
46. Id. at 1007. The objective component is described as "was the deprivation sufficiently
serious?" Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991) (emphasis added) (quoted in Hudson,
112 S. Ct. at 1007).
47. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1007.
48. See generally Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:"
The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969) (arguing that the framers of the United
States Constitution borrowed the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause from the English
Bill of Rights and misinterpreted its meaning as only a ban against torturous punishments,
rather than a ban against excessive or disproportionate punishments).
49. Id. The English Bill of Rights was drafted upon the accession of William and Mary.
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976). The language of the Eighth Amendment was
first introduced in America on June 12, 1776 as one provision of Virginia's Declaration of
Rights. Granucci, supra note 48, at 840.
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limited the prohibition to a ban on torturous or barbarous punishments."0
This definition of cruel and unusual punishments, however, was far from
definite."1
A. Expanded Protections Under the Eighth Amendment
1. The Eighth Amendment Develops from a Ban on Torturous
Punishments to a Ban on Disproportionate Punishments
Courts originally interpreted the Eighth Amendment as a ban only on
torturous punishments. The first expansion of the Eighth Amendment was
the interpretation that it also prohibited disproportionate punishments. In
Weems v. United States, 2 a majority of the Supreme Court held, for the first
time,5 a that a punishment violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause because it was disproportionate to the crime.54 Weems was con-
victed by a Philippine trial court of falsifying a public and official docu-
ment. 5 The Philippine court sentenced Weems to 15 years imprisonment at
50. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910) (commenting that "the terms
[cruel and unusual punishment] imply something inhuman and barbarous, torture and the
like"); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (stating that "[plunishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death"); see also Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36
(1879) (stating that "punishments of torture... and all others in the same line of unnecessary
cruelty, are forbidden by [the Eighth Amendment]"). The Wilkerson Court followed this rea-
soning in holding that a sentence of death by public shooting did not violate a convicted mur-
derer's Eighth Amendment rights. Id. at 134-35. But cf Granucci, supra note 49, at 843-44
(asserting that these early interpretations "seriously misinterpreted English law.... Great
Britain developed, prior to 1689, a general policy against excessiveness in punishments, but it
did not prohibit 'barbarous' punishments that were proportionate to an offense").
51. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 368-69 ("What constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment
has not been exactly decided.... No case has occurred in this court which has called for an
exhaustive definition."); Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135-36 (stating that "[d]ifficulty would attend
the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that
cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted").
52. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
53. Prior to Weems, one dissenting opinion broadened the Eighth Amendment's ban past
its confines of merely protecting against torturous punishments. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S.
323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) (commenting that the Eighth Amendment's "inhibi-
tion is directed ... against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are
greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged").
54. Weems, 217 U.S. at 377. The Court stated that the statute under which the plaintiff
was sentenced, "is cruel in its excess of imprisonment .... Its punishments come under the
condemnation of the bill of rights, both on account of their degree and kind." Id.
55. Id. at 357. Weems was an "acting disbursing officer of the Bureau of Coast Guard
and Transportation of the United States Government of the Philippine Islands." Id.
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hard and painful labor.56 In addition, Weems' sentence precluded him from
ever holding public office or voting in the Philippines.57
The Supreme Court held that Weems' sentence was disproportionate to
the crime committed. By comparing it with the more lenient sentence im-
posed by Philippine courts for the falsification of bank notes, the Court de-
termined that Weems' sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.58 Thus,
the Court moved the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause a step away
from its historical position as a mere protection against torturous punish-
ments, adding a ban on disproportionate punishments to the clause's protec-
tions.59 The Court, however, still failed to provide a precise definition of the
cruelty sought to be avoided by the Eighth Amendment.
2 A Prohibition Against the Unnecessary and Wanton Infliction of Pain
The Supreme Court continued its expansion of the Eighth Amendment
beyond the mere recognition that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause forbids disproportionate punishments. The second significant expan-
sion was the prohibition against the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain on prisoners. 6° In Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber,61 the Supreme
Court held that the malfunction of an electric chair was an unforeseeable
accident and not within the scope of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause's prohibition. 62 Resweber involved a proposed second attempt to
electrocute a prisoner after the chair malfunctioned on the first attempt.63
For the first time, the Court used the expressions "forbids the infliction of
56. Id. at 358, 364. The prison sentence fell within the statute's 12 year and one day
minimum and 20 year maximum period of incarceration for falsifying a public document. Id.
at 364.
57. Id. at 364. The Court noted that these features of Weems' sentence amounted to "a
perpetual limitation of his liberty." Id. at 366. The Court also stated that "[s]uch penalties for
such offenses amaze those who ... believe that it is a precept of justice that punishment for
crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense." Id. at 366-67.
58. Id. at 380-81. The sentence for the falsification of bank notes was a fine of not more
than 10,000 pesos and a prison term of no longer than 15 years. Id. at 380. The Court stated,
"this contrast ... condemns the sentence in this case as cruel and unusual." Id. at 381.
59. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 591 (1977) (citing Weems to support the proposi-
tion that the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that are excessive to the crime com-
mitted); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 n.7 (1976) (citing Weems as the oldest case
supporting the statement that "[t]he [Eighth] Amendment... proscribes punishments grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime") (citation omitted); Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (holding that a statute which imposed a 90 day jail term for the crime
of being a drug addict was unconstitutional because the punishment was disproportionate to
the crime).
60. Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947).
61. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
62. Id. at 464.
63. Id. at 460.
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unnecessary pain"" and "[p]rohibition against the wanton infliction of
pain '  in defining the Eighth Amendment's protections.66 The Court rea-
soned that the unintended malfunction of the electric chair was not a willful
infliction of pain, and, therefore, not a violation of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause.67 The Court maintained that an accident is not viola-
tive of the Eighth Amendment.6  Thus, the Court expanded the focus of
the Eighth Amendment from a prohibition against torture to a prohibition
against the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.69 The amendment,
however, still provided no protection against the cruel and unusual condi-
tions faced by inmates or the pain inflicted on prisoners through the use of
excessive force by their guards.
3. The Move Beyond Punishments Formally Meted Out by Judges or
Sentencing Statutes
A third expansion of the Eighth Amendment resulted in the application of
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause beyond punishments formally
meted out by judges or sentencing statutes.7 ° This expansion of the clause's
scope enabled the Supreme Court to apply the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause to the general conditions of confinement in a prison.71 In Es-
telle v. Gamble,72 for example, the Court held that a prison administrator's
deliberate indifference toward an inmate's medical needs violated the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause."' The Court, for the first time, applied
64. Id. at 463.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 464. The Court stated that:
[t]here is no purpose to inflict unnecessary pain nor any unnecessary pain involved in
the proposed execution. The situation of the unfortunate victim of this accident is
just as though he had suffered the identical amount of mental anguish and physical
pain in any other occurrence, such as, for example, a fire in the cell block.
Id.
68. Id.
69. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
70. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
71. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, III S. Ct. 2321 (1991) (deciding whether overcrowding,
excessive noise, insufficient locker storage space, inadequate heating and cooling, improper
ventilation, dirty bathrooms, unsanitary dining areas, and sharing cells with mentally ill in-
mates were conditions that violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause); Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (deciding whether housing two inmates in one cell at one par-
ticular prison violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S.
678, 685 (1978) (stating that conditions of confinement are "subject to scrutiny under Eighth
Amendment standards"); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (stating that
"harsh 'conditions of confinement' may constitute cruel and unusual punishment") (quoting
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347).
72. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
73. Id. at 104-05.
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the Eighth Amendment to a hardship not contained in the prisoner's sen-
tence.74 In Estelle, the prisoner alleged that prison officials 7" did not provide
adequate medical treatment for a back injury he received while on a prison
work assignment.76 Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, explained
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that transgress "the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety.",77 Justice Marshall also noted that states have the duty to provide
health care to their prisoners.7 a Justice Marshall then surmised that denying
medical treatment to a prisoner would be a violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment because such "deliberate indifference" to a prisoner's physical needs is
an "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."79 After conducting an
Eighth Amendment analysis of Gamble's claims using the deliberate indiffer-
ence standard,8" the Court denied the prisoner's claim against the prison
doctor because the doctor had merely exercised medical judgment"' rather
than exhibited a deliberate indifference to Gamble's medical needs. 82
Even though the prisoner in Estelle was not successful in proving an
Eighth Amendment violation, he did help to expand the arena of Eighth
Amendment protections recognized by the Supreme Court. After Estelle,
the Court continued to expand the scope of the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
74. Id.; see Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1006 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(stating that "[i]t was not until 1976-185 years after the Eighth Amendment was adopted-
that this court first applied it to a prisoner's complaint about a deprivation suffered in prison").
75. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 98. Gamble sued the Director of the Texas Department of Correc-
tions, his prison's warden, and his prison's chief medical officer. Id.
76. Id. at 98-101. On November 9, 1973, a bale of cotton fell on Gamble. On November
10, 1973, a prison doctor diagnosed Gamble as suffering from a lower back strain. The prison
doctor prescribed various pain relievers and muscle relaxants, but Gamble continued to experi-
ence severe back pain through February 11, 1973 when Gamble wrote his complaint. Id.
During this period, the prison disciplinary committee placed Gamble in "administrative segre-
gation" and eventually solitary confinement because he refused to work. Id. at 99-101.
77. Id. at 102. Justice Marshall also stated, "[t]he [Eighth] Amendment embodies 'broad
and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency' against which
we must evaluate penal measures." Id. (citation omitted).
78. Id. at 103.
79. Id. at 103-04 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint opinion of
Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens)). The Court clarified its conclusion by noting that an
"accident" or "inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care" or negligence should not
be "characterized as wanton infliction of unnecessary pain." Id. at 105. The Court did state,
however, that punishments that are without penological justification amount to an "unneces-
sary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. at 103-04 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173).
80. Id. at 106-08.
81. Id. at 107-08 (distinguishing matters within medical judgment from violations of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause).
82. Id. at 108. The Court remanded the case to the court of appeals to consider the
claims against the Director of the Texas Department of Corrections and the prison's warden.
Id. The Court felt that the lower court had not decided these claims. Id.
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ments Clause in Hutto v. Finney. 3 In Hutto, the Court affirmed a district
court ruling that conditions at two Arkansas prisons constituted cruel and
unusual punishment and upheld the district court's order to limit periods of
punitive isolation to 30 days.8 4 In Hutto, the Court reiterated that condi-
tions of confinement are reviewable by federal courts under the Eighth
Amendment. 5 In light of the Estelle and Hutto cases, many federal courts
began to review and remedy the conditions of confinement faced by the na-
tion's prisoners.86 This judicial intervention, however, was soon curtailed by
the Supreme Court.
B. A Retreat From Eighth Amendment Protections and Prohibitions
During the 1980s, the Supreme Court retreated significantly from its pre-
vious expansion of the prohibitions promulgated under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause. The first retreat occurred in Rhodes v. Chap-
man.7 In Rhodes, the Court held that the "double celling"88 of prisoners
did not violate the Eighth Amendment.8 9 Two inmates9° from an Ohio state
prison filed a complaint against prison administrators seeking an injunction
prohibiting the practice of double celling at their prison.9' The prisoners
83. 437 U.S. 678 (1978). Bill Clinton, as Arkansas' Attorney General, was on the state's
brief for Hutto v. Finney; however, an assistant attorney general argued the case before the
Supreme Court. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 679.
84. Id. at 681.
85. Id. at 685. The Court stated, "[c]onfinement in a prison... is a form of punishment
subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards." Id.
86. See generally, Gray, supra note 6; see also Douglas W. Dunham, Inmates' Rights and
the Privatization of Prisons, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1475, 1482-83 (1986) (explaining the rationale
for courts' applying the Eighth Amendment to general conditions of confinement).
When the government imprisons individuals, it must assume responsibility for their
well-being, because incarceration largely prevents inmates from caring for them-
selves. The treatment of inmates must not be "inconsistent with contemporary stan-
dards of decency." Consequently, if a state fails to provide prisoners with basic
necessities, such as adequate food and medical care, or to take reasonable steps to
ensure their physical safety, it subjects them to cruel and unusual punishment.
Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).
87. 452 U.S. 337 (1981). See generally Martin K. Thomas, Note, The Effect of Rhodes v.
Chapman on the Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 35 ARK. L. REV. 731
(1982) (arguing that the Court's holding and reasoning in Rhodes restricted the scope of the
Eighth Amendment).
88. "Double celling" means housing two prisoners in a single cell. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at
339-40. Each cell at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility is approximately 63 square feet
regardless of whether it houses one or two inmates. Id. at 341.
89. Id. at 352.
90. The plaintiffs were Kelly Chapman and Richard Jaworski. Id. at 339.
91. Id. at 340. The Court noted that "[a]s relief, respondents sought an injunction barring
petitioners, who are Ohio officials responsible for the administration of SOCF [Southern Ohio
Correctional Facility], from housing more than one inmate in a cell, except as a temporary
measure." Id. The district court agreed with the prisoners, holding that "double ceiling is
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claimed that double ceiling confined the inmates too closely causing over-
crowding in the facility, which increased tensions and hostilities.92 Though
the Court conceded that the practice might inflict pain,93 the justices con-
cluded that the plaintiffs had not introduced facts that proved that double
celling unnecessarily and wantonly inflicted pain.94 Therefore, double cel-
ling did not violate the Eighth Amendment. 95
Whitley v. Albers 96 represents the Court's next major retreat from Eighth
Amendment principles. This case arose after a guard shot a prisoner in the
leg during a prison riot.97 The prisoner claimed that the guard used exces-
sive force and thus violated the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights.98 Rul-
ing against the prisoner, the Whitley Court concluded that, in the context of
a prison riot,99 "deliberate indifference"'" to a prisoner's bodily security did
cruel and unusual punishment under the circumstances at [Southern Ohio Correctional Facil-
ity]." Id. at 344.
92. Id. at 340, 349 n.14.
93. Id. at 349.
94. Id. at 348. The Court concluded, "there is no evidence that double ceiling under these
circumstances either inflicts unnecessary or wanton pain or is grossly disproportionate to the
severity of crimes warranting imprisonment." Id. The Court added that "the Constitution
does not mandate comfortable prisons." Id. at 349. The Court also reasoned that harsh con-
ditions "are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society."
Id. at 347. The Court expressed its deference to the state legislatures and state prison officials
in administrating each states' prison system. Id. at 349-50, 352.
95. Id. at 348. Sensing the tone of Justice Powell's majority opinion, Justice Brennan
wrote a concurring opinion, "to emphasize that today's decision should in no way be construed
as a retreat from careful judicial scrutiny of prison conditions." Id. at 353 (Brennan, J., con-
curring). But see Elizabeth Alexander, The Overall Context of Prison Litigation, in 2 SECTION
1983 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 1992, supra note 8, at 413 (stating
that "[tihe major result of cases like Rhodes is that totality of conditions cases, including
overcrowding cases, are virtually impossible to win, and generally should not be attempted").
96. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
97. Id. at 316.
98. Id. at 317.
99. Id. at 320. Justice O'Connor stated, "[t]he general requirement that an Eighth
Amendment claimant allege and prove the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain should
also be applied with due regard for differences in the kind of conduct against which an Eighth
Amendment objection is lodged". Id. The Court stated that during a prison riot, "deliberate
indifference" should not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation because, under such tense
and dangerous circumstances, guards are faced with "competing obligations" of ensuring the
safety of prison staff and inmates. Id. The Court upheld the propostion in Wilson v. Seiter,
stating that "(w]here (as in Whitley) officials act in response to a prison disturbance, their
actions are necessarily taken 'in haste, under pressure,' and balanced against 'competing insti-
tutional concerns for the safety of prison staff or other inmates.' " Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct.
2321, 2326 (1991) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320). "In such an emergency situation ....
wantonness consisted of acting 'maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm.'" Id. (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028,
1033 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)).
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not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.1 Although the Court de-
clared that prison excessive force claims are Eighth Amendment subject
matter, 2 the majority denied the prisoner's claim. 13
The majority reasoned that under the tense and dangerous circumstances
present during a prison riot, guards face competing obligations of ensuring
the safety of prison staff, inmates, and themselves."°4 A guard, therefore,
must act "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm"' 5 to be found liable for the use of excessive force against a prisoner
during a riot."°6 In determining whether a guard acted maliciously and
sadistically, a judge may examine "such factors as the need for the applica-
tion of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that
was used, [and] the extent of injury inflicted."'0 7 The dissent in Whitley,
called the majority's adoption of the malicious-and-sadistic standard "espe-
cially onerous."'0 8 The dissent instead advocated applying the "unnecessary
and wanton"" standard to all Eighth Amendment cases, with the jury con-
sidering the factors and circumstances of each case. "0
After the Whitley excessive force case, the Supreme Court's next major
Eighth Amendment ruling on the treatment of prisoners came in Wilson v.
Seiter, "' a case concerning the conditions of confinement. In Wilson, an
inmate at Hooking Correctional Facility in Ohio filed a complaint against
100. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320. "[D]eliberate indifference" to a prisoner's medical needs is
an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
101. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320.
102. Id. at 327. The Court stated, "[w]e think the Eighth Amendment, which is specifi-
cally concerned with the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in penal institutions, serves
as the primary source of substantive protection to convicted prisoners in cases such as this one,
where the deliberate use of force is challenged as excessive and unjustified." Id. The Court
added, "[b]ecause this case involves prison inmates rather than pretrial detainees or persons
enjoying unrestricted liberty ... the Due Process Clause affords respondent no greater protec-
tion than does the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause." Id..
103. Id. at 326.
104. Id. at 320.
105. Id. at 320-21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 321 (quoting Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033). Judge Friendly, writing for the major-
ity in Johnson, stated, "[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the
peace of the judge's chambers, violates a prisoner's constitutional rights." Johnson, 481 F.2d
at 1033.
108. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 328 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 329 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For cases establishing this standard, see Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
110. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 329-30.
111. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
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his prison's warden 112 and the Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabili-
tation and Correction."13 The complaint alleged several inhumane condi-
tions' 14 at the prison and prayed for injunctive relief as well as $900,000 in
damages." 5 The Court held that prisoners who allege that their conditions
of confinement violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause must
show that prison officials acted with a culpable state of mind when creating
the conditions about which the prisoners complained." 6 The Court further
held that a prison official acting with deliberate indifference is culpable for
Eighth Amendment purposes." 7
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, reasoned that the Court's previous
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause cases turned on either an objective
component-whether the deprivation was sufficiently serious" 8 or a subjec-
tive component-whether the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state
of mind. " 9  Justice Scalia attempted to "synthesize"'' 20 prior Eighth
112. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. 2323. The warden was Carl Humphreys. Id.
113. Id. Richard P. Seiter was the Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction. Id.
114. Id. The complaint listed "overcrowding, excessive noise, insufficient locker storage
space, inadequate heating and cooling, improper ventilation, unclean and inadequate rest-
rooms, unsanitary dining facilities and food preparation, and housing with mentally and physi-
cally ill inmates" as inhumane treatment. Id.; cf Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1978)
(finding that conditions, such as 100-man barracks, prevalent homosexual rape, frequent stab-
bings, and an eight-by-ten foot punitive isolation cell, violated the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause).
115. Wilson, 11l S. Ct. at 2323.
116. Id. at 2325-26; see Leading Cases, supra note 5, at 236 (noting that "in Wilson v.
Seiter, the Supreme Court took a large step in the direction of reinstituting a policy of defer-
ence to prison administrators").
117. Wilson, 11l S. Ct. at 2327. Justice Scalia stated that "'[w]hether one characterizes
the treatment received ... as inhumane conditions of confinement, failure to attend to his
medical needs, or a combination of both, it is appropriate to apply the "deliberate indifference"
standard.'" Id. (quoting LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 391-92 (4th Cir. 1987)). See gener-
ally Gray, supra note 6 (providing background on prison conditions cases and the impact of
Wilson v. Seiter on prison law). In Wilson, the Supreme Court "articulated for the first time a
state-of-mind requirement for establishing that prison conditions violate the Eighth Amend-
ment. It is no longer enough for a prisoner to demonstrate that he is confined in squalor. He
must prove the squalor to be the product of a 'deliberately indifferent' official." Id. at 1341.
118. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2324. The Court held that conditions violate the Eighth Amend-
ment's objective component if they deny prisoners an "identifiable human need." Id. at 2327.
119. Id. at 2323-25. The Court cited Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (concern-
ing conditions of confinement) as an example of judicial inquiry into the objective component
of the Eighth Amendment. Wilson, 11 S. Ct. at 2324. The Court also cited Whitley v. Al-
bers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) (concerning a guard's use of excessive force), Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97 (1976) (concerning medical deprivation), and Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,
329 U.S. 459 (1947) (concerning a second attempt at electrocution) as examples of judicial
inquiries into the subjective component. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2323-24.
120. Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1006 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see Alex-
ander, supra note 95, at 413 (calling the Court's approach in Wilson an attempt to "rationalize
and harmonize" its previous Eighth Amendment decisions).
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Amendment jurisprudence by stating that all Eighth Amendment claims
must satisfy both an objective and subjective component test. 12' Justice
Scalia also urged that the Eighth Amendment contains an inherent intent
requirement.1 22 The majority remanded the case because the district court
improperly decided it under the very high 123 malicious-and-sadistic stan-
dard, rather than the deliberate indifference standard.'
24
Justice White, concurring only in the judgment, 125 strongly disagreed
with Justice Scalia's analysis in Wilson.126 In particular, Justice White dis-
puted Justice Scalia's conclusion that the Eighth Amendment contains an
implicit intent requirement. 127 Justice White stated that excessive force
cases involve an intent requirement, but conditions of confinement cases do
not. 12' Thus, Justice White believed that since the case at bar was a condi-
tions of confinement case, the Court should not require that the plaintiff
meet an intent requirement.'
29
121. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2324-25; see also Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1006 (1992) (stating that
"an inmate seeking to establish that a prison deprivation amounts to cruel and unusual punish-
ment always must satisfy both the 'objective component' ... and the 'subjective component'
.... Both are necessary components; neither suffices by itself"); see Alexander, supra note 95,
at 414-15 (noting that the adoption of the objective and subjective components to Eighth
Amendment analysis substantially narrowed the scope of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause).
122. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2325 ("The source of the intent requirement is ... the Eighth
Amendment itself .... If the pain inflicted is not formally meted out as punishment by the
statute or the sentencing judge, some mental element must be attributed to the inflicting officer
.. .. ").
123. Id. at 2326.
124. Id. at 2328 (White, J., concurring) (acknowledging that applying the "more lenient
'deliberate indifference' standard" might not change the outcome of the case because the plain-
tiffs proved at most mere negligence, which does not amount to a Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause violation); see Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986); see also Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976).
125. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2328. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined Justice
White's concurring opinion. Id.
126. Id. at 2328-31; see also Leading Cases, supra note 5, at 236 (commenting that "[b]y
defining 'punishment' in an artificially narrow way, the Court effectively placed prison condi-
tions outside the purview of the Eighth Amendment and circumscribed the opportunities for
courts to play a role in prison reform").
127. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2329-30. Justice White stated that when a court hears "chal-
lenges to conditions of confinement[,] ... [judges] examine only the objective severity, not the
subjective intent of government officials." Id. Justice White went on to distinguish conditions
of confinement cases, which have no intent element, from excessive force or medical depriva-
tion cases, which include the prisons official's intent as one of the factors in determining
whether conduct amounted to a cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 2330.
128. Id. at 2329-30.
129. Id. at 2328.
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C. The Significant Injury Requirement: A Fifth Circuit Anomaly
Like Wilson's objective and subjective components, the significant injury
requirement is a relatively recent addition to Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence. In 1989, the Fifth Circuit first articulated the significant injury re-
quirement in Johnson v. Morel,'3 ° a Fourth Amendment excessive force
case. "' In Johnson, the Fifth Circuit held that an arrestee who received cuts
on his wrists from tightly applied handcuffs did not suffer a sufficiently sig-
nificant injury for Fourth Amendment purposes. 132 The court reasoned that
the judicial inquiry in Fourth Amendment excessive force cases is an objec-
tive inquiry.' 33 Therefore, the purely objective significant injury require-
ment is appropriate. 134 The Eighth Amendment controls in excessive force
cases only if the force occurred after the prisoner was convicted.
In 1990, the Fifth Circuit fused its Fourth and Eighth Amendment exces-
sive force cases by adding the Fourth Amendment's significant injury re-
quirement to its Eighth Amendment standard.1 3- In Huguet v. Barnett,136
the Fifth Circuit held that the lower court was correct to dismiss a prisoner's
Eighth Amendment claim since the prisoner only suffered a slightly frac-
tured elbow as a result of a scuffle with two guards. 137 The court reasoned
that excessive force claims under the Eighth Amendment, like those under
the Fourth Amendment, require a showing of a significant injury.' 38 A ma-
jor distinction, however, between Fourth and Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence is that judicial inquiry into the guard's intent, ancillary to Fourth
130. 876 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
131. Id. The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he rights of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated .... U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Previously, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments governed allegations of excessive force occurring prior to conviction. Johnson, 876 F.2d
at 479. After the Supreme Court decided Hudson, however, the Fifth Circuit announced that
courts should apply the Whitley malicious-and-sadistic standard to allegations of excessive
force brought by pre-trial detainees. Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1446 (5th Cir. 1993).
132. Id. at 480.
133. Id. at 479.
134. Id. at 479-80.
135. Huguet v. Barnett, 900 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a convicted prisoner,
like the arrestee in Johnson v. Morel, must prove that he suffered a significant injury in order to
prevail on an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim). Prior to Huguet v. Barnett, the
Supreme Court held that the Fourth and Eighth Amendments embody distinct areas of juris-
prudence, and courts should judge claims brought under these two amendments by distinct
standards. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); see Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327
(1986) (stating that "the Eighth Amendment, which is specifically concerned with the unneces-
sary and wanton infliction of pain in penal institutions, serves as the primary source of substan-
tive protection to convicted prisoners in cases . . . where the deliberate use of force is
challenged as excessive and unjustified").
136. 900 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1990).
137. Id. at 840-42.
138. Id.
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Amendment excessive force cases, is the primary focus of Eighth Amend-
ment excessive force cases.1
39
After Whitley and Wilson, the federal courts were uncertain about the
proper standard to apply to excessive force cases. In Whitley, the Supreme
Court applied the malicious-and-sadistic standard when the excessive force
occurred during a prison riot, but offered no general standard applicable to
such cases in a non-riot context.14° Furthermore, Wilson added the objec-
tive and subjective component analysis to Eighth Amendment conditions of
confinement cases, but did not state the nature of the objective and subjective
components in prison excessive force cases. 141 In particular, the Supreme
Court had not decided whether, as the Fifth Circuit asserted, prison exces-
sive force claims required a significant injury to satisfy the Eighth Amend-
ment's inherent objective component. The Supreme Court sought to answer
these open questions in Hudson v. McMillian.142
II. HUDSON v. MCMILLIAN: REJECTING THE SIGNIFICANT INJURY
REQUIREMENT
A. The Majority Opinion
In Hudson v. McMillian, the Court clarified the role of objective factors in
deciding prison excessive force cases. 1 3 Justice O'Connor, writing for the
majority, held that the extent of a prisoner's injuries may be one factor that
courts consider, but that a significant injury to the prisoner should not be a
threshold requirement for a successful cruel and unusual punishments claim
against an abusive guard." Thus, a guard's use of excessive force against a
139. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (stating that "[a]n officer's evil intentions will not make
a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an of-
ficer's good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional"); see also
R. Wilson Freyermuth, Comment, Rethinking Excessive Force, 1987 DUKE L.J. 692, 693 (stat-
ing that in excessive force cases, the Fourth Amendment judicial inquiry is "wholly
objective").
140. See supra notes 96-107 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
142. 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
143. Id. at 998.
144. Id. at 999. The Court stated that "[t]he absence of serious injury is... relevant to the
Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end it." Id. The Court further explained, "[w]hat is
necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
depends upon the claim at issue... 'with due regard for differences in the kind of conduct
against which an Eighth Amendment objection is lodged.'" Id. at 1000 (quoting Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986)). The majority also stated that the Eighth Amendment
.. '."draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society,"' and so admits of few absolute limitations." Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chap-
man, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality)).
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prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment even if the prisoner's
injuries are minor. 145
In deciding to uphold the magistrate's $800 award of damages to Hud-
son,' 4 6 the Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's argument that Hudson's lack of
a significant injury precluded him from obtaining a judgment against the
guards who beat him. 47 The Court explained that the scope and meaning of
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is "responsive to 'contemporary
standards of decency.' "14' The majority reasoned that guards transgress
contemporary standards of decency whenever they intentionally cause pain
to prisoners by engaging in unwarranted violence. 149 The Court determined
that guards who violate contemporary standards of decency thereby violate
the Eighth Amendment, irrespective of the severity of the victim's inju-
ries.'50 Thus, the majority held that in prison excessive force cases, the ob-
jective inquiry into the extent of injury is not controlling.' 5 ' The guard's
subjective intent is more significant.' 52
The Court further clarified the law surrounding prison excessive force
cases by holding that the Whitley standard 53 now governs all excessive
145. Id. at 999. The Court acknowledged that the "prohibition of 'cruel and unusual'
punishment necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical
force .... [but that Hudson's injuries were] not de minimis." Id. at 1000. Subsequent to the
Hudson decision, courts have used the de minimus exception to deny claims of excessive force.
See, e.g., Jackson v. Culbertson, 984 F.2d 699, 700 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that a guard who
sprayed plaintiff with a fire extinguisher engaged in only a de minimus use of force and was not
liable); Olson v. Coleman, 804 F. Supp. 148, 150 (D. Kan. 1992) (stating that a single blow to a
prisoner's head was not a violation of the Eighth Amendment because it was a de minimum
use of pain); Candelaria v. Coughlin, 787 F. Supp. 368, 374 (S.D.N.Y.) (finding that a guard's
pushing his fist against a prisoner's neck was a deminimum use of force that did not vioalte the
Eighth Amendment), aff'd, 979 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1992).
146. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1002; see Hudson v. McMillian, 929 F.2d 1014, 1015 (5th Cir.
1990) (describing the $800 award as a "modest judgment"), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
147. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 999-1000. The Fifth Circuit held that even though the guards
"physically mistreated" Hudson, his "minor" injuries, which "required no medical attention,"
were "insufficient" to constitute a violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
Hudson, 929 F.2d at 1014-15.
148. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).
149. Id. The Court explained that "[w]hen prison officials maliciously and sadistically use
force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated." Id.
150. Id. The Court stated that prison officials violate contemporary standards of decency
"whether or not significant injury is evident." Id.
151. Id. at 999. The Court stated that "[t]he absence of serious injury... does not end [an
Eighth Amendment inquiry]." Id.
152. Id. The Court stated that "whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive
physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial
inquiry is... whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,
or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Id. (emphasis added).
153. Id. The Court in Whitley held that "whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary
and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on 'whether force was applied in a good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of
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force cases.' 54 The majority followed precedent by stating that the unneces-
sary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause.' 55 The majority then maintained that what constitutes the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain depends upon the nature of the
allegations.' 56 The majority concluded that when allegations concern exces-
sive force, the malicious-and-sadistic standard should apply, whether the al-
leged excessive force occurred while the prisoners are holding hostages and
rioting or while the prisoners are handcuffed, shackled, and completely
within the guards' control.
157
B. Justice Stevens' Concurring Opinion
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens criticized the majority's appli-
cation of the malicious-and-sadistic standard to all prison excessive force
cases.' 5 ' Justice Stevens argued that when there are allegations of a guard's
use of excessive force against a prisoner and the tense and precarious circum-
stances of a riot are absent, the Court should apply the less demanding un-
causing harm.'" Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986) (quoting Johnson v. Glick,
481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)).
154. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 999.
155. Id. at 998. The Court stated that" 'the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain...
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.'" Id. (quot-
ing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977))).
156. Id., The Court noted that deliberate indifference is the proper standard when a pris-
oner alleges inadequate medical care, but that "application of the deliberate indifference stan-
dard is inappropriate when authorities use force to put down a prison disturbance." Id.
157. Id. at 998-99.
Many of the concerns underlying our holding in Whitley arise whenever guards
use force to keep order. Whether the prison disturbance is a riot or a lesser disrup-
tion, corrections officers must balance the need "to maintain or restore discipline"
through force against the risk of injury to inmates. Both situations may require
prison officials to act quickly and decisively.
Id. The majority reasoned further that "[t]his Court derived the Whitley test from one articu-
lated by Judge Friendly in Johnson v. Glick, a case arising out of a prisoner's claim to have
been beaten and harassed by a guard." Id. at 999 (citation omitted). But see Johnson v. Glick,
481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.) (involving alleged force against a pre-trial detainee, and, therefore,
normally governed by the Fourth Amendment's Due Process Clause), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1033 (1973). The Court declined to decide whether an isolated and unauthorized assault by a
guard constitutes punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at
1001. Justice Thomas commented, "[i]f we ultimately decide that isolated and unauthorized
acts are not 'punishment,' then today's decision is a dead letter." Id. at 1007 n.2 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
158. Id. at 1002 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens commented that "the Court's
reliance on the malicious and sadistic standard is misplaced." Id. Because Justice Stevens
believed that McMillian's and Woods' conduct met even the high malicious-and-sadistic stan-
dard, Justice Stevens concurred in all of the majority's opinion, save the application of the
Whitley standard to non-riotous circumstances. Id. Thus, Justice Stevens agreed with the
majority's conclusion that a prisoner need not prove a serious or significant injury to maintain
a cognizable excessive force claim under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Id.
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necessary and wanton infliction of pain standard. 5 ' Justice Stevens offered
no further standard to define what constituted the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain in excessive force cases, as opposed to conditions, dispro-
portionate sentence, or deprivations cases."6 Despite his disagreement with
the Court's choice of standard, Justice Stevens nonetheless agreed with the
majority's conclusion that a significant injury is not a threshold requirement
for a prisoner's successful cruel and unusual punishments claim.' 6'
C. Justice Blackmun's Concurring Opinion
Justice Blackmun, like Justice Stevens, did not agree with the majority's
selection of standard of review. ' 62 Otherwise, Justice Blackmun agreed with
the majority's conclusion that a significant injury is not a prerequisite to
bringing an excessive force claim under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause. 163 Justice Blackmun wrote his concurring opinion to address two
personal concerns that were not mentioned in either the majority opinion or
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion."64 First, responding to the argument,
advanced by five states filing an amicus curiae brief, that requiring prisoners
to prove a significant injury reduces the number of cases that are presently
clogging the judicial system, 65 Justice Blackmun explained that the Court
would not permit such docket-management concerns to diminish the power
of the express constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punish-
159. Id. Justice Stevens had advocated the use of this standard in previous cruel and unu-
sual punishments cases. Id.; see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ.).
160. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1002; see also Barbara Kritchevsky, Making Sense of State of
Mind: Determining Responsibility in Section 1983 Municipal Liability Litigation, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 417, 462 n.229 (1992) (commenting that in the context of the Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishments Clause, "Justice Stevens is the one member of the Court who argues that
subjective motivation should not determine whether the Constitution has been violated"). But
cf Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 998 (arguing that the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain
always violates the Eighth Amendment, but what constitutes the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain "varies according to the nature of the alleged constitutional violation").
161. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1002.
162. Id. at 1003 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun was one of the original
dissenters in Whitley. Id.; Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 328 (1986). Thus, Justice Black-
mun was opposed to the application of the malicious-and-sadistic standard even in the context
of a prison riot. Id., at 328-34.
163. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1003. Justice Blackmun stated that he joined "the Court's solid
opinion and judgment that the Eighth Amendment does not require a showing of 'significant
injury' in the excessive-force context." Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Brief for Texas, Hawaii, Nevada, Wyoming, and Florida as amicus curiae
at 15, Hudson v. McMillian, 929 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1990) (No. 90-653 1), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 995
(1992)). The brief argued that the "'significant injury requirement has been very effective in
the Fifth Circuit in helping to control its system-wide docket management problems.'" Id.
Justice Blackmun called this an "audacious approach to the Eighth Amendment." Id.
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ments.' 66 To further discount the docket-management argument, Justice
Blackmun added that the Court's ruling did not open the floodgates for a
deluge of claims from prisoners.
167
Justice Blackmun's second concern was that the protection afforded by
the Eighth Amendment should not be limited to mere physical harm, but
should also include psychological harm. 16' He conceded that the case at bar
did not contain the issue of psychological harm because the prisoner did not
claim that the guards' acts of violence had caused him to feel anguished,
fearful, or severely despondent. 169 Justice Blackmun noted, however, that in
the process of rejecting the significant injury requirement, the Court stated
that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is a protection against pain,
not injury. 170 Thus, he reasoned that unlike injury, the word pain connotes
both physical and psychological harm, 171 and courts recognize psychological
harm as creating a cause of action in both tort and constitutional law.
172
Justice Blackmun concluded that courts should not label psychological pain
as de minimis pain, which, according to the majority opinion, the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause does not protect. 173 Justice Blackmun claimed
that the infliction of psychological pain can qualify as the kind of unneces-
166. Id. Justice Blackmun stated that the brief's approach "assumes that the interpreta-
tion of an explicit constitutional protection is to be guided by pure policy preferences for the
paring down of prisoner petitions.... [T]his inherently self-interested concern has no appro-
priate role in interpreting the contours of a substantive constitutional right." Id. A circuit
judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with Justice Black-
mun and commented that docket management was one factor that led to the development of
the significant injury requirement. See Carolyn D. King, A Matter of Conscience, 28 Hous. L.
REV. 955, 963-64 (1991) (arguing that the significant injury requirement is an example of
combating an excessive case load by disadvantaging plaintiff prisoners rather than squarely
confronting the problem).
167. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1003.
By statute, prisoners-alone among all other § 1983 claimants-are required to ex-
haust administrative remedies. Moreover, prison officials are entitled to a determina-
tion before trial whether they acted in an objectively reasonable manner, thereby
entitling them to a qualified immunity defense. Additionally, a federal district court
is authorized to dismiss a prisoner's complaint in forma pauperis "if satisfied that the
action is frivolous or malicious." These measures should be adequate to control any
docket-management problems that might result from meritless prisoner claims.
Id. at 1003-04 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988)) (citations omitted).
168. Id. at 1004.
169. Id.
170. Id. Justice Blackmun stated, "[a]s the Court makes clear, the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 'pain,' rather than 'injury.'" Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. In the context of prison excessive force cases, the Eighth Circuit held that a pris-
oner who alleged receiving death threats at gunpoint from a guard stated an adequate claim
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, even though the prisoner did not allege
receiving any physical injuries. Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 100 (8th Cir. 1986).
173. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1004.
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sary and wanton infliction of pain prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause.17
4
D. Justice Thomas' Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Thomas argued that a prisoner must first establish
that he suffered a significant injury in order to prove that a guard's use of
force violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 175  Justice
Thomas based his argument on a study of the Eighth Amendment's his-
tory17 6 and an examination of the objective and subjective components in-
herent in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 177
According to Justice Thomas, since the Eighth Amendment historically
applied only to sentences that amounted to torturous punishments,17 8 courts
did not apply it to alleviate general conditions of confinement or to compen-
sate individual prisoners when guards mistreated them. 179 Justice Thomas
further argued that because Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has histori-
cally exhibited a judicial reluctance to interfere with prison administra-
tion,'° this reluctance should continue as the norm today.'81
Justice Thomas also argued that requiring a prisoner to prove that he suf-
fered a serious injury limits the scope of the Eighth Amendment' 82 and, in
174. Id. Justice Blackmun noted that "psychological pain can be more than de minimis.
Psychological pain often may be clinically diagnosed and quantified through well established
methods, as in the ordinary tort context where damages for pain and suffering are regularly
awarded." Id.
175. Id. at 1004-05 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas' dissent was joined by Justice
Scalia. Id. at 1004. Justice Thomas commented that "a use of force that causes only insignifi-
cant harm to a prisoner may be immoral, it may be tortious, it may be criminal, and it may
even be remediable under other provisions of the Federal Constitution, but it is not 'cruel and
unusual punishment.'" Id. at 1005.
176. Id. at 1005-07; see supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
177. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1006-08; see supra notes 118-122 and accompanying text.
178. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1005.
179. Id. Justice Thomas stated that "[flor generations, judges and commentators regarded
the Eighth Amendment as applying only to torturous punishments meted out by statutes or
sentencing judges, and not generally to any hardship that might befall a prisoner during incar-
ceration." Id.
180. Id. Justice Thomas noted that "historically, the lower courts routinely rejected pris-
oner grievances by explaining that the courts had no role in regulating prison life." Id.; see
also Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir.) (stating that "it is well settled that it is
not the function of the courts to superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners in peni-
tentiaries, but only to deliver from imprisonment those who are illegally confined"), cert. de-
nied, 342 U.S. 829 (1951).
181. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1006-07; see Paul McGreal, Back to the Future: The Supreme
Court's Retroactivity Jurisprudence, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 595, 615 (1992) (comment-
ing that Justices Thomas and Scalia were "the lone voices for a strict, historically-faithful
reading of the Constitution" in Hudson v. McMillian).
182. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1007.
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turn, acts as a necessary limit on the administrative remedies that a trial
judge can order. 8 3 The serious injury requirement therefore ensures that
judges will not use the Eighth Amendment as a vehicle to personally imple-
ment prison administration reforms. 184 Justice Thomas stated that the seri-
ous injury requirement represents a judicial recognition that prisoners, by
virtue of being in prison, will not be free from all hazard, difficulty, and
discomfort.' 8 5 Thus, the dissenting opinion argued that a violation of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is predicated on the plaintiff's suf-
fering a significant injury,1 86 and the judicial inquiry into this injury should
be limited to whether it was sufficiently serious.' 87 Justice Thomas con-
cluded that the majority's decision-that no serious deprivation is required
to bring a cruel and unusual punishments claim-went beyond the bounds of
the judiciary's role and was essentially an interference with prison
administration. 88
Justice Thomas also reasoned that only sufficiently serious injuries satisfy
the objective component inherent in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause.' 89 Justice Thomas stated the objective component inquiry as
183. Id. Justice Thomas stated that "because deprivations of all sorts are the very essence
of imprisonment, we made explicit the serious deprivation requirement to ensure that the
Eighth Amendment did not transfer wholesale the regulation of prison life from executive
officials to judges." Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. But see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) (stating that "though
his rights may be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, a
prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime.
There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.");
Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 215 (8th Cir. 1974) (declaring that
"[s]egregation from society and loss of one's liberty are the only punishment the law allows").
186. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1007. Justice Thomas stated that to violate the Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishments Clause, "a serious deprivation is always required." Id.
187. Id. Justice Thomas noted that "a court's task in any given case was to determine
whether the challenged deprivation was 'sufficiently' serious.' " Id.
We made it clear in Estelle that the Eighth Amendment plays a very limited role in
regulating prison administration .... We rejected the claim because the inmate failed
to allege 'acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs.' From the outset, thus, we specified that the Eighth Amend-
ment does not apply to every deprivation, or even every unnecessary deprivation,
suffered by a prisoner, but only that narrow class of deprivations involving 'serious'
injury inflicted by prison officials ....
Id. at 1006 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
188. Id. at 1007. Justice Thomas commented that when a serious injury was required, "a
court's task ...was not, as the Court's interpretation today would have it, to determine
whether a 'serious' deprivation is required at all." Id.
189. Id. at 1006. Justice Thomas stated, "[t]hese subjective and objective components, of
course, are implicit in the traditional Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, which focuses on
penalties meted out by statutes or sentencing judges." Id.; see Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct.
2321, 2324 (1991) (articulating the doctrine of an objective and subjective component inherent
in the Eighth Amendment).
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whether the deprivation was sufficiently serious."9 Under Justice Thomas'
analysis, a prisoner alleging a Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause vio-
lation must always satisfy this objective component by proving a serious
injury. 19 1
The dissent believed that the majority counteracted its disregard of the
Eighth Amendment's objective component requirement 92 by demanding an
unnecessarily high subjective component standard.' 93 When analyzing the
existence of the subjective component in a particular Eighth Amendment
case, Justice Thomas would replace the majority's malicious-and-sadistic
standard with the deliberate indifference standard. 194 Thus, under Justice
Thomas' analysis of excessive force cases, a prisoner would have to show
that he suffered a sufficiently serious injury to satisfy the objective compo-
nent of an Eighth Amendment inquiry. 95 In addition, the prisoner would
also have to prove that the guard acted with deliberate indifference toward
his bodily safety and security in order to satisfy the subjective component. 196
Only upon establishing both elements could a prisoner prevail under the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 197
The dissent's explicit adoption of the objective/subjective component
analysis represents a stark and definite addition to excessive force jurispru-
dence.' 98 The majority's approach, however, while appearing to be a moder-
190. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1006 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2324. But
see Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1000 ("The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is
... contextual and responsive to 'contemporary standards of decency.' ") (quoting Estelle, 429
U.S. at 103).
191. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1006 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas explained that
"an inmate seeking to establish that a prison deprivation amounts to cruel and unusual punish-
ment always must satisfy both the 'objective component ... (was the deprivation sufficiently
serious?)' and the 'subjective component (did the officials act with a sufficiently culpable state
of mind?)'" Id. (quoting Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2324).
192. Id. at 1007. Justice Thomas observes that "the Court... asserts, the serious depriva-
tion requirement is satisfied by no serious deprivation at all." Id.
193. Id. at 1008. The majority applied the malicious-and-sadistic standard. Id. at 998.
Justice Thomas stated, "[p]erhaps to compensate for its elimination of the objective component
in excessive force cases, the Court simultaneously makes it harder for prisoners to establish the
subjective component." Id. at 1008 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
194. Id. Justice Thomas stated that "'deliberate indifference' is the baseline mental state
required to establish an Eighth Amendment violation." Id. Justice Thomas continued
"[m]any excessive force cases do not arise from guards' attempts to 'keep order.' ... I see no
justification for applying the extraordinary Whitley standard to all excessive force cases, with-
out regard to the constraints facing prison officials." Id.
195. Id. at 1009-10. Justice Thomas stated, "I think our precedents clearly establish that a
prisoner seeking to prove that he has been subjected to 'cruel and unusual' punishment must
always show that he has suffered a serious deprivation." Id.
196. Id. at 1008. Justice Thomas noted that "Departure from this ['deliberate indiffer-
ence'] baseline is justified where... prison officials act in response to an emergency. . . ." Id.
197. Id. at 1006.
198. See supra notes 175-97 and accompanying text.
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ate change, will restrict the ability of prisoners to be recompensed under the
Eighth Amendment for excessive force used against them.' 99
III. IN SEARCH OF A JUST STANDARD WITHOUT AN UNJUST
INJURY REQUIREMENT
The first question the Hudson court faced was whether a prisoner alleging
that guards used excessive force against him, in violation of his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments, is re-
quired to prove that he suffered a significant injury.2 "° The Court's rejec-
tion of the significant injury requirement will have positive effects on future
excessive force jurisprudence. However, although the Court's rejection of
the significant injury requirement makes its opinion appear favorable to pris-
oners and supportive of a strengthened Eighth Amendment, in reality, the
majority's adoption of the malicious-and-sadistic standard to all prison
excessive force cases will serve as a barrier to Eighth Amendment
protections.20 '
A. No Significant Injury Requirement
The Supreme Court's rejection of the significant injury requirement en-
sures that judicial inquiries into excessive force cases will continue to focus
on the guard's intent in using the force, rather than on the objective effect of
that use of force.20 2 The majority opinion followed established judicial pre-
cedent by focusing on intent in Eighth Amendment excessive force cases and
stressing both intent,and effect in conditions of confinement cases arising
under the Eighth Amendment.20 3 This judicial focus on the guard's intent
distinguishes prison excessive force cases, decided under the Eighth Amend-
ment's constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments,
from ordinary tort cases. 2° This focus also precludes guards from inflicting
199. See infra notes 208-23 and accompanying text.
200. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 997.
201. See infra notes 208-23 and accompanying text.
202. See Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991) (stating that "Eighth Amendment
claims based on official conduct that does not purport to be the penalty formally imposed for a
crime require inquiry into state of mind").
203. Compare Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986) (focusing the judicial inquiry
on the guards' state of mind, not on the resulting injury) with Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 347 (1981) (focusing the judicial inquiry on the severity of conditions and the prison
administrators' intent). But see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 15-9, at 1335 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that intent is not relevant in conditions of confinement
cases).
204. See Kritchevsky, supra note 160, at 424-25 (noting that in Eighth Amendment cases,
as opposed to ordinary tort cases, the courts conduct a judicial inquiry into the defendant's
state of mind). "Emphasizing that the Constitution protects against injuries attributable to
abuse of power, not to the lack of due care that defines tortious conduct, the Court has held
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inhumane forms of torture and punishment on prisoners without violating
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.2°5
By maintaining that the extent of a prisoner's injury is one of many factors
courts should consider in prison excessive force cases, 2" the Supreme Court
also granted judges additional discretion in deciding Eighth Amendment
cases. Unlike the dissent, the majority's approach affords a judge the discre-
tion to find culpability despite less severe injury if the prison guards caused
such injury in a particularly egregious manner.20 7 Thus, the Court chose a
practical and reasoned approach when it allowed the extent of a prisoner's
injury to be one of the factors, but not the determinative factor, that courts
consider when deciding excessive force cases.
B. Selecting A Standard That Fits The Circumstances
The dissenting and concurring opinions' disagreement with the majority's
application of the malicious-and-sadistic standard reflects a genuine legal
concern over a misplaced2"' standard. The Whitley court expressly adopted
the demanding2" malicious-and-sadistic standard because of the counter-
that only conduct evincing some degree of deliberate wrongdoing can violate the Eighth...
Amendment[ ]." Id. (footnotes omitted). But see Charles F. Abernathy, Section 1983 and
Constitutional Torts, 77 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1460 (1989) (commenting that "the Court's newly
recognized principle of referring to constitutional law to identify standards of care for § 1983
actions has one enormous initial flaw: the Constitution contains not one single reference to
such tort-like standards of care").
205. See Hudson 112 S. Ct. at 1002-03 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that if a signifi-
cant injury was required, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause "might not constrain
prison officials from lashing prisoners with leather straps, whipping them with rubber hoses,
beating them with naked fists, shocking them with electric currents, asphyxiating them short
of death, intentionally exposing them to undue heat or cold, or forcibly injecting them with
psychosis-inducing drugs"); see also Urbonya, supra note 6, at 177, 235 (arguing that the judi-
cial inquiry in all excessive force cases should be whether the alleged force was "unjustified").
206. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 999.
207. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 929 F.2d 1014, 1015 (5th Cir. 1990) (reversing a grant
of a "modest judgment" to a prisoner, who guards handcuffed, shackled, and then beat, be-
cause the prisoner's claim "founder[ed] on the significant injury prong"), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 995
(1992); see Alexander, supra note 95, at 414 (commenting that "requiring that a court find
both an objective and subjective component before it can declare an Eighth Amendment viola-
tion ignores the differences between damage and injunctive actions, as well as among various
types of possible Eighth Amendment violations"); Kritchevsky, supra note 160, at 457-58 (not-
ing that under Wilson analysis, the courtfirst determines whether the injury alleged was suffi-
ciently serious and if not, the court cannot impose liability on the guard or the municipality
responsible for the harm); see also TRIBE, supra note 203, § 15-9, at 1332 (stating that
"[t]urning square comers ... must never become a substitute for respecting the humanity of
each individual").
208. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1002 (Stevens, J., concurring).
209. See id. (arguing that the majority should have applied the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain standard because it is "less demanding" than the malicious-and-sadistic stan-
dard); Urbonya, supra note 6, at 176, 224 (calling the Whitley decision, which adopted the
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vailing pressures on guards during riotous situations.210 This standard,
however, has no place in ordinary excessive force cases when such counter-
vailing pressures are not present. 211 The guards' use of excessive force in
Hudson occurred while a single prisoner was handcuffed, shackled, and
under the control of two guards.212 In contrast, the alleged use of excessive
force in Whitley occurred during a guard-led forceful intervention into a
prison riot, after inmates had taken one guard hostage, beaten a fellow in-
mate, and threatened to kill the hostage with a homemade knife.2 13 As the
facts in the two cases are quite disparate, the state-of-mind standard that the
court applied to each set of facts should have been distinct as well. 214
The majority may have applied the malicious-and-sadistic standard to all
excessive force cases in order to provide consistency in its excessive force
decisions 215 or, perhaps, to counteract its holding that a significant injury is
malicious-and-sadistic standard, a "narrow protection to prisoners under the eighth amend-
ment" and labeling the malicious-and-sadistic standard an "'extremely heavy' burden").
210. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). The Court stated:
[w]here a prison security measure is undertaken to resolve a disturbance . . . that
indisputably poses significant risks to the safety of inmates and prison staff, we think
the question whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and
suffering ultimately turns on "whether force was applied.., maliciously and sadisti-
cally for the very purpose of causing harm."
Id. (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033
(1973)).
211. See Williams v. Mussomelli, 722 F.2d 1130, 1132 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that "prece-
dents established in one context [of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence] do not always transfer
comfortably to another"); Martin A. Schwartz, Supreme Court Review: Section 1983 Litigation
October 1991-June 1992, in I SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY'S
FEES 1992, supra note 8, at 10 (commenting that it makes little sense to apply the malicious-
and-sadistic standard to alleged uses of excessive force outside a prison disturbance context);
Urbonya, supra note 6, at 229-30 (arguing that plaintiffs should not have to meet the burden of
the malicious-and-sadistic standard in excessive force claims against state officials).
While it may be appropriate to require a prisoner to prove malice for a claim arising
from the use of force during a prison riot, such a strict standard would not be neces-
sary absent the heightened exigencies of a riot. When interpreting eighth amendment
personal security claims, courts should not hesitate to distinguish between those
cases involving the state's substantial interest in maintaining prison order, as found
in Whitley, and those cases devoid of this compelling state interest.
Id. at 231-32; see Freyermuth, supra note 139, at 704 n.74 (stating that prison excessive force
exerted without a legitimate purpose should be governed by the deliberate indifference
standard).
212. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 997.
213. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 315-16.
214. See id. at 320 ("The general requirement that an Eighth Amendment claimant allege
and prove the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain should also be applied with due re-
gard for differences in the kind of conduct against which an Eighth Amendment objection is
lodged.").
215. See id. at 323-24 (adopting the malicious-and-sadistic standard the first time the
Supreme Court decided an Eighth Amendment excessive force case). Since 1986, the federal
courts have been very inconsistent about which standard to apply in prison excessive force
1993]
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216not an essential requirement of an excessive force case. Whatever the
reason, the malicious-and-sadistic standard is inappropriate when guards
handcuff, shackle, and then beat a prisoner. 217 The Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause is an express constitutional protection of the people 2 " and,
therefore, an implied constitutional limit on the government.21 9 The mali-
cious-and-sadistic standard, which requires a high level of evil intent on the
part of a guard, 220 does not reflect the language of the Eighth Amendment,
which protects against state imposed harm.
On the other hand, the deliberate indifference standard implicitly
acknowledges that the Eighth Amendment provides an express protection
against state imposed excessive force.22' In Whitley, the Court considered
applying the deliberate indifference standard, but rejected it in favor of the
malicious-and-sadistic standard, which allowed guards some flexibility when
they face the tense and dangerous circumstances of a prison riot.222 In ex-
cases. See, e.g., Haynes v. Marshall, 887 F.2d 700, 703 (6th Cir. 1989) (applying the mali-
cious-and-sadistic standard); Unwin v. Campbell, 863 F.2d 124, 130 (1st Cir. 1988) (rejecting
the application of the malicious-and-sadistic standard because there was no "actual
disturbance").
216. See Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1008 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (commenting that "(plerhaps
to compensate for its elimination of the objective component in excessive force cases, the Court
simultaneously makes it harder for prisoners to establish the subjective component").
217. See Linda Greenhouse, High Court Defines New Limit on Force By a Prison Guard,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1992, at Al (commenting that "[r]equiring evidence that officials acted
'maliciously and sadistically' even in less extreme conditions places a heavy legal burden on
inmates").
218. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 318. The Court stated that "(t]he Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause 'was designed to protect those convicted of crimes.' " Id. (quoting Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977)).
219. Id. The Court stated that "[t]he language of the Eighth Amendment ... manifests 'an
intention to limit the power of those entrusted with the criminal-law function of govern-
ment.'" Id. (quoting Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664).
220. See generally id. at 312.
221. Id. at 318; cf Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652-53 (7th Cir. 1985) (arguing
that deliberate indifference is similar to the criminal law concept of recklessness), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 816 (1986); Leading Cases, supra note 5, at 241 n.47 (stating that "'deliberate indif-
ference' cannot be thought to encompass gross negligence").
222. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320. The Court explained that it was trying to decide whether to
apply the deliberate indifference standard or a higher standard to allegations of excessive force
in the context of a prison riot. Id. The Court stated,
The general requirement that an Eighth Amendment claimant allege and prove the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain should also be applied with due regard for
differences in the kind of conduct against which an Eighth Amendment objection is
lodged. The deliberate indifference standard articulated in Estelle was appropriate in
the context presented in that case .... In this setting [a prison riot], a deliberate
indifference standard does not adequately capture the importance of such competing
obligations [of ensuring the safety of inmates and staff], or convey the appropriate
hesitancy to critique in hindsight decisions necessarily made in haste, under pressure,
and frequently without the luxury of a second chance.
Id. (emphasis added).
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cessive force cases outside of the prison riot context, however, whether a
guard exhibited deliberate indifference to a prisoner's bodily safety and se-
curity should determine whether a guard violated the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause. Substituting the deliberate indifference standard for
the malicious-and-sadistic standard would re-institute the Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishments Clause's protective component and would partially correct
the Supreme Court's recent retreat from the express grant of protection af-
forded by the clause.22 3
C. The Role of the Court
Reluctance to intervene has long marked the judiciary's approach to
prison excessive force cases.224 This reluctance has been largely based on a
show of deference to state legislators and prison officials. 225 To some extent,
judicial reluctance to disturb the penal environment created by prison offi-
cials is still in existence.226 The Hudson dissenters criticized judicial inter-
vention into prison administration, especially when judges claim to have a
constitutional justification for their intervention. 227 The dissent warned that
judges should not use the Eighth Amendment as a "National Code of Prison
Regulation." 2
28
223. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can
Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20 (1989) (commenting that "[t]he results
courts announce... will ... have continuing effects that reshape the nature of what the courts
initially undertook to review, even beyond anything they directly order anyone to do or refrain
from doing").
224. See supra note 5.
225. See supra note 6.
226. See Leading Cases, supra note 5, at 236 ("[I]n Wilson v. Seiter [1991], the Supreme
Court took a large step in the direction of reinstating a policy of deference to prison adminis-
trators."); Friedman, supra note 5, at 927 (stating that the policy of showing deference to
prison officials by refusing to intervene in the internal affairs of prisons continues to some
degree today).
227. Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1010 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice
Thomas stated, "(t]oday's expansion of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause beyond all
bounds of history and precedent is, I suspect, yet another manifestation of the pervasive view
that the Federal Constitution must address all ills in our society.... [The] primary responsibil-
ity for preventing and punishing such conduct rests not with the Federal Constitution but with
the laws and regulations of the various States." Id. But see United States v. Carolene Prod-
ucts, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (commenting that "[t]here may be narrower scope for opera-
tion of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments"). The
Carolene Products Court continued by suggesting that "prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Id.
228. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 1010 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Prisoners, however, need a societal institution that protects and preserves
their rights. In addition to the moral reasons advanced for preserving pris-
oners' rights, if prisoners needs are not protected by a societal institution,
prisoners may resort to rioting, their historical method of calling attention to
their grievances and mandating reforms.22 9 Prisoners, unlike ordinary citi-
zens, cannot rely on state legislatures to represent their interests.23 1 State
legislatures focus on pleasing citizens who can vote, rather than prisoners
whose right to vote is often revoked by state statute. 23' Additionally, the
general public does not display a strong urge to reform America's prisons
and protect those incarcerated from unwarranted physical attacks by their
guards.232 Accordingly, the courts, which are insulated from the politics of
anti-prisoner sentiment, have the strongest duty to protect prisoners, and
should assume this role in an effort to balance popular anti-prisoner senti-
ment.23 3 In addition, this role is mandated by the judiciary's function as
229. See William C. Collins, The Defense Perspective on Prison-Conditions Cases, in I PRIS-
ONERS AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 7-7 (warning that "one potential effect of reduced court
intervention may be to return to those unfortunate days when prison reform occurred only as
the intermittent result of prison riots and other institutional scandals"); Klein, supra note 5, at
9 (stating that news coverage of the violent riots at Attica and San Quentin caused a change in
both public and judicial attitudes toward the plight of prisoners); Friedman, supra note 5, at
921 (noting that the general public takes no notice of prison cruelties unless prisoners riot).
230. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 377 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating
that "[i]n the current climate" of rising crime rates and the prevailing view that "we lock the
prison door and throw away the keys," it is "unrealistic" to expect state legislators to protect
or advance the rights of prisoners); Friedman, supra note 5, at 941 ("Today's crime rates have
created a hardened political climate toward crime and criminals ....").
231. See Scott D. Anderson et al., Note, A Review of Prisoners'Rights Litigation Under 42
U.S.C § 1983, 11 U. RICH. L. REV. 803, 806 n.13 (1977) (stating that in most states, prisoners
convicted of serious crimes become disenfranchised during their period of incarceration); Wal-
ter M. Grant et al., Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 23
VAND. L. REV. 929, 975 (1970) ("The state.., provisions disenfranchising persons convicted
of criminal offenses are ... diverse .... Despite this diversity, the result in the overwhelming
majority of states is that citizens convicted of serious crimes, usually felonies, lose their right to
vote .. "); see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 24.1-42 (Michie 1985); see also Leading Cases, supra
note 5, at 243 n.56 (stating that state legislators, "conscious of the existence of dilapidated
prisons may nonetheless shy away from increasing prison funding for fear of appearing to be
reluctant players in the war on crime").
232. See Friedman, supra note 5, at 935 (commenting that there is a pervasive view in
society that prisoners are treated too well because they receive better treatment than the worst-
off non-criminals in our society). "Many citizens feel that we coddle, rather than punish,
convicts." Id.
233. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 359 ("Insulated as they are from political pressures, and
charged with the duty of enforcing the Constitution, courts are in the strongest position to
insist that unconstitutional conditions be remedied ....") (Brennan, J. concurring); RUDOV-
SKY, supra note 1, at xi (stating that "[p]ublic attention is directed only sporadically toward
the subhuman conditions that prevail in these institutions, and usually only because the prison-
ers ... dramatize their situation by protest"). The authors further note that during the de-
cades that the judicial system viewed the prisons with a hands-off policy, the "abdication of
judicial responsibility reinforced the status quo of prison life and, because no other political or
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protector of the rights espoused in the Constitution and by the Supreme
Courts' own articulation of its role in protecting "discrete and insular minor-
ities." '234 Prisoners, by virtue of their inability to vote and their physical
isolation from the rest of society, represent the quintessential "discrete and
insular minority ' 2 35 whose claims, under the Eighth Amendment, should be
heard and addressed by the courts without the judicial restrictions of the
significant injury requirement and the malicious-and-sadistic standard.
Application of the deliberate indifference standard to excessive force cases
outside of the prison riot context would not represent an unwarranted judi-
cial intrusion into the administration of prisons.236 Likewise, the deliberate
indifference standard would not overly expose prison guards to liability,
since their negligent acts would still be immune from Eighth Amendment
liability.2
37
social institutions responded to the prisoners' complaints, the penal system became isolated
from public scrutiny." Id. at xii (emphasis added); Friedman, supra note 5, at 927 (arguing
that courts, which are outside the political process, are in a strong position to rectify the injus-
tices suffered by prisoners in prisons).
234. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see TRIBE, supra
note 203, § 16-34 at 1625 n.41.
In effect, the Supreme Court has held that the law's responsiveness and accountabil-
ity, both to those it affects, [convicts], and to those in whose name it is imposed,
requires a structure of decision increasingly open to individual, purposive argument
as the groups injured increasingly resemble discrete and insular minorities, or as the
interests sacrificed increasingly parallel those otherwise entitled to special judicial
protection ....
Id. (citation omitted); King, supra note 166, at 964 (calling prisoners some of the nation's
"most vulnerable citizens" and arguing that the significant injury standard "materially disad-
vantaged" prisoners in order to decrease the number of prisoner-filed complaints).
235. See Lois G. Forer, The Prisoner and the Psychiatrist, 31 EMORY L.J. 61, 69 (1982)
("Most prisoners are poor, ignorant, and disadvantaged people. Few are articulate and many
are minorities. Many are unloved and unlovable. They are very different form the educated,
middle class ....").
236. See Klein, supra note 5, at 14 (noting that by adopting the deliberate indifference
standard, the Estelle court "did not choose the most liberal alternative").
237. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976) (stating that negligence, even if it
causes pain or anguish, is not actionable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause);
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (holding that a second attempt to
execute a prisoner did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment when the chair malfunc-
tioned in the first attempt); see, e.g., Kritchevsky, supra note 160, at 421 (positing a hypotheti-
cal in which a guard with insufficient training who injures a prisoner with a taser gun would
not be liable under the deliberate indifference standard because the harm resulted from negli-
gence, not evil intent). "The Constitution only protects against conscious governmental ac-
tion, chiefly action that contains an element of oppression or abuse." Id. at 431. "[Clourts
have consistently held that a finding of deliberate indifference requires more than a lack of due
care." Friedman, supra note 5, at 937.
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IV. CONCLUSION
By eliminating the requirement that an inmate prove a significant injury to
prevail in an excessive force claim, the Supreme Court took a positive step
toward preserving prisoners' civil rights under the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause. By maintaining, however, that prisoners must prove that
guards acted maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm, the Court adopted a difficult and frequently insurmountable standard
for prisoners to meet. The Court should instead require that prisoners prove
that the guard who allegedly used excessive force did so with deliberate in-
difference for the prisoner's bodily security and safety. This standard is par-
ticularly appropriate in cases, such as Hudson v. McMillian, when the
prisoner posed no security threat to the guards, other inmates, or himself.
Implementing such a standard would accurately reflect the express grant
of protection from unnecessary harm accorded to prisoners under the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause. Stripped of the right to vote, segregated
from society, and labeled a convict for life, a prisoner represents one of the
most discrete and insular of all minorities. Prisoners should be able to de-
pend on the courts to preserve their express constitutional protection by con-
ducting a fair judicial inquiry. A judicial inquiry that utilizes a biased
standard requiring that a guard act maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm, intensifies the societal discrimination against pris-
oners, rather than alleviating it.
Jennifer Buehler
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